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Strategic Exchange-Rate Policy of Accession Countries 
in ERM II 
 
Abstract 
Exchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have often
been a subject matter. Yet, some new insights in terms of political economy 
considerations upon exchange-rate policy are provided. It is pointed out that it is
more appropriate to analyse exchange-rate policy in course of Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM II) with regard to a changing incentive structure. In doing so,
considerable moral hazard problems become apparent. 
ERM II shall provide for an adequate level of convergence between prospective and
current members of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, this institutional
arrangement and, particularly, its impact on the incentives for exchange-rate policy 
making might enable CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current
members. Accordingly, the phase of ERM II is considered to be a bargaining on the
distribution of costs of convergence between prospective and current members of 
EMU. In return, accession countries would offer to maintain public support for
European integration. The CEEC’ leverage in this bargaining rests on brinkmanship,
i.e. putting exchange-rate regimes at risk, thus possibly undermining the according 
public support. 
This paper delineates the basic assumptions and conditions for successful
brinkmanship, points out the specific transmission mechanisms, and characterises
this kind of exchange-rate policy as ‘threaten-thy-neighbour’. Overall analysis results 
in a cautious outlook on probable effects of such strategic exchange-rate policies on 
European institutional and economic matters. 
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Section 1 
 
This paper studies the exchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC), particularly regarding their performance in Exchange-Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), 
i.e. the period before their admittance to the European Monetary Union (EMU). The 
decisions taken at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002 cleared the way for the 
accession countries
1 to join the European Union (EU) in May 2004. At that time, CEEC are 
provided to enter ERM II: According to the schedule—as there is no opting-out for the 
prospective EU-members—they are supposed to join EMU two years later in 2006. 
Analysis indicates that ERM II is not just one of several Maastricht criteria for qualifying for 
EMU-membership, but might provide other political incentives than its founders have 
initially imagined. Basically, ERM II and other Maastricht criteria are to ensure an adequate 
level of convergence between prospective and current members of EMU. Regarding a 
smooth functioning of EMU, it seems to be economically desirable, to require approximately 
the same level of convergence in an enlarged eurozone. 
Whereas Maastricht addresses rather nominal convergence, real convergence is here of 
particular interest. The latter means that standards of living between current and prospective 
members of EMU are getting closer. This is usually defined by a narrowing gap of GDP per 
capita. 
Prospective members have actually to bear the burden of those costs of convergence entirely 
by themselves. According to the rationale of the Maastricht criteria: If they will not be able to 
persevere the transition process of convergence, they would not attain access to EMU. 
Regarding ERM II, however, this institutional arrangement and its implications for the 
incentives of policy-making bodies—particularly with regard to exchange-rate policy—might 
enable accession countries to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members. 
CEEC might probably put their exchange-rate regimes deliberately at risk. In that manner—
i.e., in case of a default, thus undermining public support for EMU-membership—they would 
possibly impair the entire European integration process. 
Because of that effect, the period of ERM II can be considered as a bargaining
2, i.e. a 
challenge of distributing the costs of convergence between prospective and current members 
                                                           
1 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. When analysing CEEC (hereafter synonymous to ‘accession countries’), Cyprus and Malta are not 
concerned. These countries do not fit into the here-developed argumentation. 
2 NB: A corresponding formal game theoretic analysis will not be presented, but the possibility of brinkmanship 
in ERM II is—hopefully—thoroughly demonstrated.   5
of EMU in exchange for public support for European integration in accession countries.
3 The 
paper indicates that ERM II can give CEEC some leeway in the according bargaining. In this 
respect, accession countries exert exchange-rate policy strategically. Accession countries can 
potentially force current members of EMU to provide somewhat pecuniary assistance. A 
policy of gradual escalation, i.e. brinkmanship, could eventually result in an exchange-rate 
crisis. Though a successful brinkmanship implies that the crisis scenario will not occur. 
Whether such brinkmanship is actually effective, will depend on whether it fulfils specific 
conditions. In particular, a successful brinkmanship has to meet two conditions in terms of 
effectiveness and acceptability. That is to say, that CEEC really must be able to coerce current 
members of EMU into providing assistance, thus, averting an exchange-rate crisis and a 
consequential drop of public support for European integration in accession countries. In this 
regard, the effectiveness condition would be fulfilled. Likewise, the acceptability condition 
holds as long as CEEC do not perceive themselves to be too close to the brink. If these 
conditions are valid, then brinkmanship represents a credible threat. 
Such a strategy necessarily requires that current members of EMU are basically willing to pay 
for CEEC’ admittance to, firstly, EU and later on EMU. In this context, former allowances 
for CEEC by the EU and—just recently—the decisions taken at the Copenhagen summit 
point slightly at the current members’ willingness to pay for the prospective members. In 
Copenhagen, they agreed on a financial package for the accession countries amounting to 
40,8 bill. € for the years 2004-2006 in order to smooth the transition process. The upshot of 
this is that an almost apparent willingness to pay entails moral hazard, i.e. inviting CEEC for 
brinkmanship. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 basic assumptions for moral 
hazard behaviour in terms of brinkmanship are discussed. In particular, reasons why the EU 
is willing to pay for CEEC’ accession to the monetary union are stressed. After that, general 
patterns of exchange-rate policies in CEEC are surveyed. Section 3 starts with a review of and 
the institutional design of ERM II. Then, particular features of economic policy formation in 
applicant countries are analysed. In doing so, the details of the brinkmanship strategy are 
elaborated. Potential countermeasures of current members of EMU are also discussed in that 
context. It is pointed out how ERM II gives CEEC some specific leeway in a subsequent 
                                                           
3 Basically, EMU is succeeding the EU-integration process. However, it can be presumed that current members 
of EMU would draw on other so-called ‘members states with a derogation’—simple members of the EU, so to 
say—to bear the respective burden, as well. Thus, the terms EU and ‘current members of EMU’ are used 
synonymous except when otherwise expressively stated.   6
bargaining on the costs of convergence. At the heart of this bargaining is a brinkmanship 
strategy. To put it bluntly, it is shown that the bargaining between prospective and current 
members of EMU consists of an exchange of sustaining public support for European 
integration in CEEC for some kind of financial assistance by current members of EMU. 





At first, the basic position for an analysis in the light of brinkmanship of CEEC is briefly 
inquired. Second, the performances of accession countries’ exchange-rate policies are 
reviewed. This contributes to an understanding of qualitative differences in exchange-rate 
policy stances, which enables to grasp characteristics of exchange-rate policy as a 
brinkmanship strategy. 
 
The crux and core of the eastward enlargement 
The core 
When analysing the enlargement process of the European Union (EU), it is assumed that it 
has been driven, essentially, by political rationale: Both parties—current as well as prospective 
members of EU—agreed on the need to stabilise the region of CEE in view of their specific 
geopolitical concerns and security policy interests. 
At the beginning of the 1990s after the fall of the iron curtain their regime eventually 
collapsed and political systems in CEEC changed fundamentally. Thus, they entered a rather 
uncertain phase. At that time, western European countries suggested an enlargement of the 
EU. In doing so, they were offering to export an established institutional system to CEEC.
4 
From the point of view of the accession countries, this option has been especially lucrative 
because of the incorporated economic benefits. Whereas the same does not necessarily hold 
true for current EU-members, since the accession countries’ economic size is rather small and 
the considerable difference in living standards suggest rather few, if any, long-term economic 
gains.
5 This points up to the political gains for current members of the EU, i.e. reducing the 
                                                           
4 The same is valid for the southern enlargement process of the EU such as in case of Greece, which acceded to 
the EU in 1981. This country had been considered as a young democracy requiring economic and political 
support (Friebel, et al. 1999:2). 
5 Baldwin et al. (1997) consider different scenarios of budget costs of the EU-enlargement. They estimate the net 
budget costs of EU-enlargement at max. 8 bn. ECU, i.e. 0.01% of the EU-15’s GDP.   7
uncertainty of state-interaction and stabilising CEEC politically (cf. Baldwin, et al. 1997:168). 
Correspondingly, the costs of convergence according to the Maastricht criteria reflect CEEC’ 
maximum willingness to pay for prospective economic and political benefits from European 
integration. 
Certainly, it could be argued that CEEC are already institutionally embedded into a somewhat 
European design of political systems. This is indeed true. However, retracting concession 
would jeopardize all CEEC’ efforts of preparing for EU-membership, i.e. fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria and adopting the acquis communautaire. In that case, their integration 
into ‘western societies’ would probably be stopped or even reversed. Either way, these 
options are politically riskier than the current stance of integrating CEEC into the EU. (Thus, 
the willingness of the EU to pay for CEEC’ membership in EMU is derived from this 
argumentation.) 
In this respect, there is a considerable difference to the former process of creating EMU. In 
the run-up to EMU, the EU-members have established Maastricht criteria in terms of a tying-
hands strategy in order to force themselves to ensure monetary and fiscal stability in the joint 
currency area and to ensure an appropriate operation of the euro (Willett 2000:388, cf. 
Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza 2000:7). In case of the most divergent southern EU-
members the Maastricht criteria have been a quite effective disciplining: Greece, once again, 
did actually not qualify for being a founding member of EMU in 1999, but joined in 2001. 
However, neither the present EMU, nor a fortiori an enlarged EMU does represent an 
‘Optimum Currency Area’. Albeit, the eurozone might be shaped in that way (De Grauwe 
1997; Frankel and Rose 1996). Correspondingly, the basic idea of the Maastricht criteria with 
regard to CEEC is that an applicant state pursuing economic policies in accordance with the 
“ins’” economic formation is capable of adapting to a single monetary policy. The criteria on 
interest rate differentials and the government debt/GDP ratio are of minor interest, besides 
the exchange-rate criterion the criteria for inflation and fiscal deficit are hereafter of specific 
interest. According to the Treaty the fiscal deficit must not be higher than 3 per cent of GDP, 
whereas inflation must be no more that 1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the 
three lowest inflation rates in current member countries of EMU. 
At present, after having set-up the ‘euro-club’, the incumbents want some outsiders to join 
them. However, if insiders are really willing to provide these outsiders access to their club, 
than this enlargement process will shape prospective insiders’ incentive structure differently. 
This time the moral hazard problem will be much more severe than in case of the former   8
Maastricht process.
6 Convergence could probably be much less enforced and, thus, 
Maastricht criteria would become probably less effective constraints. 
 
The crux 
The basic difference to the time of 1995-1997 is that Maastricht criteria do not provide a 
sophisticated tying-hands strategy, but a plain external constraint for prospective members of 
EMU: When founding the club, the primary objective has been to construct a sustainable 
EMU. However, that is obviously not the present object. While Greece as a potential 
founding member failed to qualify for EMU for the time being, the political stability of that 
country has not been at stake. At that moment, Greece might have been considered as an 
adequately consolidated democracy not requiring more European economic and political 
support. However, quite the contrary can be assumed in respect to CEEC. The political 
process and its outcomes are more uncertain when compared with the corresponding present 
formation in current EMU-member countries.
7 Thus, political stability and public support for 
European integration seems to be less consolidated in CEEC. This might probably become 
evident if they entered ERM II at the same time with their admittance to the EU and would 
experience immediately thereafter a currency crisis. Such exchange-rate crisis, then, is most 
likely to undermine the CEEC’ aspiration to EMU-membership and European integration in 
general.
8 Accordingly, it is presumed that CEEC are allowed to join EU—and finally EMU—
basically for political reasons. Therefore, there might be considerable scope for moral hazard 
behaviour when passing through the Maastricht qualification process including ERM II. 
 
This moral hazard behaviour might trigger speculative attacks on CEEC’ fixed exchange-rate 
regimes in ERM II. The preceding performance of fixed exchange-rate arrangements, for 
instance, during the former crises in 1992/93 of the European Monetary System (EMS) and 
in course of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, indicates their vulnerability. Although, some 
countries’ economic policy formation was considered to be consistent with their particular 
exchange-rate regime, market sentiments turned abruptly against them. Speculative attacks 
tested governments’ credibility of a given promise to maintain a once determined fixed 
exchange rate (here, the standard references are Obstfeld 1994, 1995). 
                                                           
6 Certainly, there has been some scope for moral hazard, particularly for countries, which might have been 
considered as rather indispensable for constructing EMU such as, for instance, Italy. 
7 The apparently high level of electoral volatility in CEEC can serve as an indicator of political uncertainty. 
There is a vast literature of studies on the volatility of the electorate in selected CEEC. See Birch (2001:5-7) for 
brief survey on that issue.   9
 
Although currency crises in CEEC would not appear automatically—for instance, on account 
of sizable interventions by the ECB—, the then rising need to raise interest rates would 
eventually trigger an abandonment of the exchange-rate regime. This holds especially if higher 
interest rates will bring about the risk of provoking a banking crisis.
9 The latter is crucial for 
CEEC, because of the eminent importance to stabilise (net-) capital inflows (recently, Begg, et 
al. 2003; Corker, et al. 2000:1). A reversal of such capital flows could deteriorate overall 
economic activity, which may cause a devaluation of a CEEC’ exchange rate for this reason 
(Foreest and de Vries 2002:24). Moreover, one country’s fall might trigger further speculative 
attacks. Such a contagion effect usually spreads among countries with similar economic 
fundamentals and political features, as is the case in CEEC. Such a spreading currency crisis 
would confront current members of EMU with economic and in particular political 
problems. 
Exchange rate crises are defined when there is to spot a change in parity, a relinquishment of 
an exchange-rate regime or an international bail-out (cf. Bordo, et al. 2001:55).
10 Generally, 
such crises come along with a considerable loss in terms of output and employment. In this 
regard, it is presumed that rising unemployment rates would undermine the public support 
for European integration and herby induce high political costs for incumbent governments. 
Thus, in course of an exchange rate crisis economic and, most notably, political integration of 
a specific CEEC into the EU might probably fail. However, this is an incidence—in 
accordance to the above-mentioned rationale of European integration—which the EU really 
wants to avoid. Thus, knowing that the incumbents are willing to pay for their accession, 
CEEC could make use of the implicit risk of loosing public support for European integration 
by putting the exchange-rate regime deliberately at risk. In doing so, they might probably 
dispose of an effective brinkmanship strategy, i.e. a credible threat enabling to elicit the EU’s 
willingness to pay. 
 
Overall, integration of CEEC into the eurozone can be regarded as a multilateral and 
deliberately arranged process. This process is divided into three distinct phases: The first lasts 
                                                                                                                                                                               
8 See IMF (2000:173) for the importance of public support for integration in CEEC. 
9 Normally, banking crises emerge at the onset of a recession. This holds in particular, if the recession follows a 
preceding economic activity that was fuelled by credits, capital inflows, and accompanied by an overvalued 
exchange rate (cf. Bordo, et al. 2001:69-72). See Kaminski and Reinhart (1998) for a detailed survey of 
transmission mechanisms of currency and banking crises. 
10 The authors also employ another index of exchange market pressure acting as an indicator for currency crises 
(ibid.).   10
until CEEC admittance to the EU – this pre-accession phase ends most likely in April 2004. 
Second, when CEEC have become members of EU they have to pass through the 
presumably two-year lasting period for qualifying for EMU-membership. Here they have to 
comply with the requirements of ERM II and other Maastricht criteria. From the onset of 
this ultimate ‘accession phase’ CEEC lose to a considerable degree their monetary sovereignty 
and exchange rate issues become a matter of common concern according to Article 124 (ex 
109m) of the Treaty. Third, CEEC are provided to be—because there is no opting-out—
affiliated EMU-members. Exchange-rate policy issues are of particular interest during the 
second phase. In the following, the performances of exchange-rate policies in CEEC are 
surveyed in order to distinguish specific types of such policies, so that the characteristics of 
the respective policies in ERM II can be classified. 
 
Stances of exchange-rate polices in CEEC 
 
Exchange-rate policy, on the one hand, is considered as comprising the choice of a specific 
regime and—given a fixed regime—the reference currency, central rate and (where 
applicable) fluctuation band; on the other hand, it has to make allowance for the underlying 
fiscal and monetary policy mix. Fiscal and monetary policy, when focusing on national policy 
objectives, have to take into account the interdependencies between the different policy areas 
and the reactions by rational private actors, particularly in case of free movement of capital. 
Accordingly, when talking about exchange-rate policy, not only the choice of exchange-rate 
regime, conversion rate etc. is meant, but also the respective fiscal and monetary policies. 
Ideally, exchange-rate policy corresponds and fits into an optimal policy mix, which would 
achieve simultaneously internal and external balance. However, inflation and output or 
external competitiveness are conflicting objectives according to the typically assumed short-
run trade-off expressed in the Philipps-curve. Obviously, exchange-rate regimes are not 
chosen once and for all, but are a corollary of certain economic conditions at a specific time. 
Exchange-rate regimes reflect main alternative focuses of exchange-rate policies: coping with 
exogenous shocks and transnational policy spill-overs, bringing down inflation, stabilising real 
exchange rates, sustaining the balance of payments equilibrium, dealing with large and volatile 
capital flows etc.   11
Principally, two ideal types of exchange-rate policy regarding fixed exchange-rate regimes and 
with reference to the above-mentioned trade-off can be distinguished.
11 First, exchange-rate 
policy can be conducted in terms of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’-policy, i.e. by competitive 
devaluations. Thus, an improvement of external competitiveness would be achieved at the 
expense of others in terms of exporting unemployment. Second, a government can perform 
exchange-rate policy, particularly in determining the external value of a currency, as a 
subordinated feature of a comprehensive monetary policy in terms of a disinflation strategy. 
These two ideal types constitute a continuum of alternative exchange-rate policies. 
Despite sharing a number of common economic features and the common target of 
becoming a member of the EU, exchange-rate regimes in the CEEC exhibit a remarkable 
diversity since the beginning of the transition process (see Table 1). This reflects not only 
specific national economic policy objectives, but also different stages of transition. 
 
  Table 1: Exchange-rate Regimes in CEEC 





Czech Republic  12/90 – 05/97  Peg  DM (65%), USD 
(35%) 
 
 Current  Managed  Float    
Estonia  Since 06/92  Currency Board  DM/Euro  +/-3% 
Hungary  03/95 – 12/98  Crawling Peg  DM/Euro (70%), 
USD(30%) 
+/-2,25% 
 Current  Peg Euro  +/-15% 
Latvia  Since 02/94  Peg  SDR  +/-1 % 
Lithuania  10/92 – 03/94  Independent Float    
  04/94 – ½  Currency Board  USD   
 Current  Currency  Board  Euro   




 Current  Independent  Float   
Slovak Republic  07/95 – 12/98  Peg  DM (60%), USD 
(40%) 
+/-7% 
 Current  Managed  Float    
Slovenia    Managed Float  Money Supply Target: 
Euro is reference 
value, informal 
 
       Source: Shoors (2001), ECB (2002) 
 
At the outset of transition with its sudden opening of CEEC’ economies, there has principally 
been a choice between two different types of exchange-rate policy depending on particular 
preferences. They could have selected a range of alternative exchange-rate policies that lie in 
                                                           
11 When exchange-rate policies are considered hereafter, it is referred to fixed exchange-rate regimes. References 
to floats are made explicit. A discussion of the political economy of floating exchange-rate regimes is omitted in 
this paper.   12
between the two ideal types of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’-policy and an exchange-rate policy 
subordinated to a comprehensive monetary policy, i.e. stabilising the price level. 
 
A specific problem of economies in CEEC at the end of the Cold War and after the 
breakdown of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was the complete 
restructuring of aggregate demand, i.e. demand was highly non-elastic: No one was prepared 
to buy goods and services produced in CEEC anymore. Accordingly, there has actually not 
been an option for enhancing external competitiveness in terms of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’-
policy. Moreover, a relative low central parity would have hampered the transition in terms of 
reconstructing the capital stock (McKinnon 1991:102-3). 
The opening to the world market and the initial price liberalisation has had the effect of 
bringing an adjustment of relative prices. When these countries under transition opened 
themselves to international trade, there had been an opportunity to import a price structure 
similar to foreign commercial partners, if local producers were forced to face a tight budget 
constraint. By fixing the exchange rate, in fact, the internal inflation cannot rise too much 
without loosing competitiveness with respect to foreign producers. The local enterprises react 
to this pressure partly by reducing inflation, and partly by reducing the output – possibly as 
less productive units are pushed out of the market. 
Moreover, at the onset of transition it has been necessary to get rid of the inherited glut of 
money. An applicable disinflation strategy can generally be based on either an exchange-rate 
targeting or an explicit inflation targeting. However, the former comes especially into 
consideration when both monetary institutions are lacking credibility and the economy is 
strongly integrated into the world market. At the beginning of the 1990s, monetary 
institutions in CEEC were actually lacking credibility. Therefore, an exchange-rate targeting in 
terms of a fixed exchange-rate regime for importing monetary credibility, thus providing a 
nominal anchor for domestic prices, has been appropriate (e.g. Fratianni and Hagen 1992; 
Giavazzi and Giovannini 1991). Such a disinflation strategy requires specific institutional 
arrangements (central bank independence, accountability of price stability, transparency etc.) 
for being effective (Mishkin 2000). The more such ‘signals’ have performed in the past, the 
easier to reduce inflation (Golinelli and Rovelli 2002). Another inflationary impact stems from 
particular features of CEEC’ catching-up. Due to international liberalisation, prices of non-
tradable goods have risen more rapidly than prices of traded goods. This Balassa-Samuelson 
(BS-) effect arises basically from a more rapid productivity growth in the traded goods sector 
relative to non-traded goods sector. Though, the respective adjustment of wages tends to   13
cope with the productivity growth in the traded goods sector, it exceeds the less enhanced 
productivity in the non-traded one. This can result in higher inflation rates.
12 
At a later stage of the transition process after the initial liberalisation of prices, CEEC 
switched in their disinflation strategy from an exchange rate to an explicit inflation targeting.
13 
This has provided an alternative signal to the local economy, showing that the stabilisation 
effort is not over, but is made more explicit and similar to the one of mature economies, i.e. 
current members of the eurozone. Additionally, Iacone and Orsi (2002) point out that a 
switch may have been due to the lift of capital control as required in course of the transition 
process. 
Despite that, CEEC still have to cope with inflationary pressures, stemming not at least from 
the catching-up process. This process is linked up with equilibrating relative prices. As a 
consequence, real exchange rates of CEEC tend to appreciate (ECB 1999:42). 
 
The main challenge for CEEC has been and still is to make the strategy of entering the EU 
compatible with the catching-up process. These two objectives might turn out to be 
contradictory with respect to the Maastricht criteria. Overall, the required policy mix to meet 
theses criteria for EMU-membership, is likely to slow down economic growth. The required 
compliance with Maastricht criteria might be challenged in course of CEEC’ passing through 





Emphasizing strategic aspects of exchange-rate policies in accession countries, first, the 
institutional design of ERM II is briefly scrutinised. In this context, related academic literature 
often starts from a description of alternative exchange-rate regimes comparing advantages 
and disadvantages for CEEC in the run-up to EMU (see, for instance, Schweickert 2001:4-
22). However, the focus here is on the incentive structure of alternative exchange rate regimes 
with respect to policy decision-making. Then, those regimes are elaborated which are most 
                                                           
12 Note, that transition economies have a higher potential for quality improvements than mature markets. 
Corresponding higher prices are hard to tell apart from nominal increases. Thus the measured average inflation 
rates may be higher for statistical reasons (Filer and Hanousek 2000). Golinelli and Rovelli (2002) point out that 
the connected competitive loss is far less relevant when producer prices indices (PPI) rather that consumer 
prices indices (CPI) are compared. 
13 In this context, Iacone and Orsi (2002) have analysed the exchange rate performances of the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary.   14
capable of exposing the political economy concerns of exchange-rate policy in ERM II, i.e. 
soft pegs and unilateral euroization.
14 In doing so, strategic aspects of exchange-rate regime 
choice with regard to ERM II can be derived.
15 In this context, possible countermeasures of 
current members of EMU are also addressed. In addition, the respective discussion can be 
tightened up by previously determining relevant marginal conditions for exchange-rate policy-
making in CEEC. Thus, the important role of trend real appreciation and of capital inflows 
for the stability of fixed exchange-rate regimes in accession countries are stressed. 
 
The design of ERM II 
 
ERM II differs only slightly from its preceding Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the 
European Monetary System (EMS). The basics of its institutional design are shortly 
delineated in the following. 
 
The most striking difference is the ‘hubs and spokes’-system: Central parities are only defined 
against the euro and not between all other participating countries. Hence, their currencies can 
fluctuate considerably more against each other making interventions probably less frequent.
16 
Interventions on the margins are binding. However, the Resolution (EU 1997) posts the price 
stability objective of central banks explicitly superior to the obligations on intervention. There 
is also the possibility of intra-marginal interventions on the basis of mutual agreement. 
The standard fluctuation band is +/– 15% around the central rate alike the EMS. According 
to the Resolution, decisions on central parities and the band are taken by mutual accord of 
the ministers of the eurozone, the ECB and the minister and central bank governor of a 
respective accession country intending to participate in ERM II – the European Commission 
and Economic and Financial Committee are only consulted. On request of an accession 
country, the above mentioned parties could agree on narrower fluctuations bands than the 
standard one alike Denmark with its present fluctuation band of +/– 2,25% margins. 
Interestingly and in contrast to the provisions of the former EMS, all parties have the right to 
                                                           
14 Coricelli (2002), for example, investigates the case of unilateral euroization. In respect to soft pegs only fixed, 
but adjustable exchange rates (with or without bands) are meant. A discussion of crawling bands or pegs and (to 
a large extent) currency boards is omitted, as these arrangements are not relevant in the context of ERM II. 
Furthermore, when practising the ‘Swedish variant’ i.e., infringing the Maastricht provisions deliberately—
CEEC might opt for staying outside of ERM II. Then, they might possibly turn to a beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy pursuing competitive devaluations. However, the focus here is that CEEC are really aspiring EMU-
membership. Accordingly, this strand of discussion is not tracked hereafter anymore. 
15 Fölsz (2003) and Fidrmuc (2002) are recent examples in literature taking into account such strategic aspects. 
16 Theoretically, the currencies of two accession countries might fluctuate up to 60% against each other around   15
initiate a confidential procedure if central rates are deemed to need realignment. Ideally, this 
procedure enables to reconsider central rates before they deviate too much from real 
equilibrium exchange rates and currency crises become inevitable. Though realignments in 
terms of devaluation would infringe the provisions of the Treaty, revaluations of central 
parities are compatible with ERM II (Article 121, ex 109j). 
 
Despite the present diversity of exchange-rate regimes in CEEC (see Table 1), these countries 
will have to switch ultimately to fixed but adjustable pegs in order to comply with the 
requirements of ERM II. The legal provisions of ERM II allow for the time being only a few 
alternative exchange-rate regimes. Apart from the original peg with a +/– 15% oscillation 
band, only conventional soft pegs are permissible. The ECB does actually not accept currency 
boards to be a substitute for participation in ERM II (ECB 2002:59-60).
17 Currency boards 
would offer accession countries an opportunity to draw on the ECB credit facilities quite 
directly. Such mechanism might probably impair the ECB price stability objective, thus 
infringe the provisions of ERM II. Moreover, the ECB refuses unilateral euroization as an 
eligible exchange-rate regime regarding the passing through of ERM II. Due to ambiguous 
institutional changes within the decision-making process in the ECB, the price stability of the 
euro might once again deteriorate. This holds when market sentiments expect the ECB to be 
too much attached with CEEC’ concerns and to accept higher inflation in the periphery (cf. 
Baldwin, et al. 2000). Besides, an early accession and thus too much heterogeneity inside 
EMU could complicate controlling in terms of monetary policy (Duisenberg 2001). 
Additionally, the Council of Ministers would have no influence to determine the conversion 
rate at which the accession countries enter the eurozone, in case of unilateral euroization 
(Buiter and Grafe 2002:5-6). Therefore, current members object in particular unilateral 
euroization in CEEC during their transition to EMU, since CEEC would as a result load 
considerable economic risks onto current members. 
Though exchange-rate policy is dealt with as a matter of common interest in, it is very useful 
to analyse the incentive structure of alternative exchange-rate regimes for policy making. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
their originally determined central parities to the euro. 
17 However, accession countries that are currently operating with a currency board (e.g. Estonia, Lithuania) 
might not necessarily be required to, firstly, float their currency within ERM II before they, secondly, re-peg it to 
the euro later (ibid.).   16
Trend real appreciation and capital inflows 
 
The issue of overvalued real exchange rates in CEEC has been already addressed in context 
of the BS-effect (see above). However, with respect to the financing of catching-up and the 
rebuilding of the capital stock a general trend towards real exchange-rate appreciations seems 
unavoidable as well as desirable. The ongoing process of real convergence and building-up of 
the capital stock requires corresponding capital inflows. Corresponding current account 
deficits would balance the capital inflows. Higher real interest rates reflect that expected rates 
of return in CEEC are higher than, for instance, in countries of current EMU-member. Thus, 
capital flows ensue. In this context, Lipschitz et al. (2001:12-14) discern a policy-dilemma: On 
the one hand, interest rates reflecting the real capital scarcity in accession countries, would be 
relative higher than in mature economies. On the other hand, considerable lower real interest 
rates would cause an imbalance between domestic saving and investment, thus a current 
account deficit and thereby capital inflows would occur. As it can be expected that risk 
premia in CEEC rather decline in course of their continuing integration into EU and the 
considerable level of free capital movement, capital flows to CEEC will probably be 
alleviated. 
In this respect, the composition of capital inflows regarding their maturity structure is of 
specific interest. Whereas FDI-inflows—dependent on relatively higher productivity of 
capital—are rather long-term capital inflows, portfolio investments are much more volatile. 
The persisting current account deficits will most likely exert considerable pressure on fixed 
exchange rates in CEEC as long as these deficits are not backed by corresponding FDI-
inflows. In general, capital inflows might have a positive impact on the institutional building 
of financial markets in CEEC. At the same time, however, applicant countries are going to be 
more exposed to sudden large shifts in capital flows deteriorating the exchange-rate regime. 
Provided an overvalued exchange rate does not slow down overall economic activity, further 
capital inflows increase the risk of exchange-rate distress. Such problems might be aggravated 
in the case of an institutional lag vis-à-vis western financial markets, as shortcomings in 
efficiency standards might lead to the creation of bubbles. 
 
This trend real appreciation is in particular a real phenomenon akin to the BS-effect, however, 
not a mere monetary issue. Thus, the corresponding overvaluation is considered to be 
independent of the exchange-rate regime question: Whether there is a peg or a floating 
exchange-rate regime, it cannot prevent such a real exchange-rate appreciation, endemic to   17
the process of convergence (Lipschitz, et al. 2001:14). On the contrary, especially fixed 
exchange rates—like in case of ERM II—might provoke a moral hazard problem when 
private sector takes successively ever more substantial open positions (Foreest and de Vries 
2002:24; Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999).The progressive liberalisation of capital flows in 
context of the acquis communautaire does not necessarily stop the trend real appreciation, 
but makes those specific exchange-rate policy arrangements rather shaky (IMF 2000:156-7; 
Mishkin 1999:22). 
A further problem in this context is that current account deficits in course of real exchange 
rate appreciations might be considered as an indicator of an impending currency crisis. 
However, a large trade deficit can also be the result of increasing confidence in economic 
policy formation (Mendoza and Uribe 1999:33). This might hold similarly true in respect to 
trend real appreciation for distinguishing it as a real economy phenomenon or just a monetary 
phenomenon indicating a loss of competitiveness. For private agents such effects might be 
hard to distinguish in particular cases. 
 
Political economy of exchange-rate policy 
 
Exchange-rate regimes in course of ERM II have to cope with this trend real appreciation 
and corresponding capital inflows. These factors might amplify CEEC’ leverage in the 
subsequent bargaining. As regards the political economy of exchange-rate policy, it has to be 
presumed that policy-makers are generally vote maximising. Thus, governments seek to 
exploit possible capacities in economic policy making in order to correspond to voters’ 
preferences. It can be assumed that policy-makers are risk-averse actors who greatly discount 
prospective future costs due to short time horizons. Furthermore, with respect to CEEC it is 
plausible to take for granted that voters in CEEC mostly favour less unemployment (see 
above). 
 
Fixed exchange rates such as pegs have been processed as a nominal anchor in CEEC, i.e. as 
a part of a comprehensive disinflation strategy (see above).
18 However, there is a need for 
                                                           
18 The following may challenge some insights of academic literature, for instance, on the functioning of 
exchange-rate pegs as a nominal anchor. Though that view is far from being wrong it might be more appropriate 
to resort analytically to such an endogenous policy view, i.e. taking into account the shaping of the incentive 
structure of relevant actors (Willet 2001:4). In a similar manner, already Eichengreen et al. pointed out that it is 
helpful to provide exit strategies for exchange-rate regimes originally designed to import monetary credibility 
(1998:10-12). In this context, Bofinger indicates that it is generally observable, that after having introduced a 
respective fixed exchange-rate regime, the risk premium of the specific currency declines from an initial high   18
conducting a prudent, rather restrictive fiscal policy. According to a simple Mundell-Fleming 
model it is especially fiscal policy that can affect output and the current account under fixed 
exchange rates and high capital mobility. Correspondingly, exchange-rate policy can be a 
tightrope act during a soft peg. Deviations from an appropriate fiscal policy stance can result 
in exchange-rate distress. A speculative attack would be triggered as soon as agents expect the 
peg to be relinquished when policy makers would probably monetise the deficit (Wolf 2001; 
cf. Watson 2001). With regard to CEEC, the most striking example in this context is the 
Czech currency crisis in May 1997 (Begg 1998). 
 
From the point of view of political economy, it is difficult for governments—in case of fixed 
exchange rates alike the soft and adjustable pegs considered here—to implement and/or to 
keep up tight monetary and fiscal policies (Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza 2000:4-5). This is 
due to the fact that exchange-rate pegging gives front loaded benefits and delayed costs: If 
there is an output gap and a corresponding level of unemployment in CEEC, then—given 
downward inflexibility of prices, particularly of wages—there might be a demand for more 
(public) expenditure. In particular, the political incentives generated by pegged rates often fail 
to provide sufficient fiscal restraints to avoid possible currency crises. That is to say, because 
fiscal laxity would undermine a peg only after some time, forcing a discrete devaluation in the 
future, while, for instance, under a float budget deficits lead to an immediate depreciation. 
Thus, assuming that the time horizon of politicians is sufficiently short, a government may be 
tempted to conduct fiscal laxity (Klyuev 2001:4). 
Moreover, it is generally high capital mobility, which fuels the consequential moral hazard 
even more. In providing lower cost for financing, it might amplify the incentives to loosen 
fiscal policy, thus, reducing short-run discipline (Andrews and Willett 1997:490; Willett 
2001).
19 As a consequence, necessary austerity policies in order to strengthen the stability of a 
fixed exchange-rate regime might be delayed for too long. In course of a possible 
monetization of government deficits such fiscal laxity would amplify trend real appreciation. 
A future devaluation would become more likely. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
level down to almost zero just to rise afterwards again (1999:15). 
19 Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza (2000) have searched for political business cycles in CEEC from 1990 to 
1999. They also empirically prove that the combination of capital mobility and fixed exchange rates even renders 
an institutional arrangement such as an independent central bank designed to deter governments from 
generating a political business cycle redundant. 
In this context, Marini and Piersanti (2001) present an interesting formalised currency-crisis model. They neither 
bothered with CEEC, nor with the concerned literature in place here. However, their model inquires the turmoil 
of currency crises in Latin America and Asia at the end of the 1990s. According to their analysis, particularly a   19
 
Unilateral euroisation, however, is a regime, which is generally most effective in avoiding 
exchange-rate distress.
20 This might be the overall objective with respect to a smooth 
transition of CEEC to EMU, since a currency crisis might heavily disrupt the integration 
process. Therefore, unilateral euroisation might be, at first glance, the best choice of an 
exchange-rate regime with regard to the elimination of exchange rate risks. There might be 
several more microeconomic advantages, for instance, the lowering of transaction costs and 
transparency of prices. These would foster economic integration, both through increased 
trade and FDI. Besides, inflation- and interest-rates can be expected to decline, particularly, in 
case of euroisation. These advantages, however, are not foregone conclusions. 
Potential disadvantages have to be reckoned: Apart from the above-mentioned problem of 
pre-selection, euroisation implies, first, a loss in terms of seigniorage. Second, the loss of a 
lender of last resort might entail some additional difficulties in terms of financial fragility. The 
third problem of unilateral euroisation is that this arrangement would immediately put 
considerable pressure on alternative adjustment mechanisms, i.e. labour flexibility and 
mobility. This might be particularly relevant in case of a high sensitivity to specific 
asymmetric shocks contributing to rising unemployment. If adjustment mechanisms do not 
function properly because of persisting (nominal) rigidities, an increase in a countries default 
risk will emerge and interest rates be (re-)raised (Wójcik 2000:72-3). It is an empirical 
question, whether exchange-rate regimes like unilateral euroisation are economically 
favourable for CEEC. Some argue, that rather those fixed exchange-rate arrangements are 
advisable for very small open economies where trade is a considerable share of national 
income like the case of Estonia, since relative erratic exchange-rate performance would 
hamper stabilisation efforts (Eichengreen and Masson 1998:3; Bofinger 1999:24). 
Above all, the most striking difference to soft pegs in respect of policy-makers’ incentive 
structures is that unilateral euroisation can be very unpleasant to national voters. This is 
precisely not valid for soft pegs. For that reason, policy makers with a sufficiently short time-
horizon will most probably favour soft pegs instead of euroization. 
This might particularly hold true with regard to ERM II when taking into account the EU’ 
willingness to pay for economic and especially political stability in CEEC. Thus, eligible 
exchange-rate regimes in the context of ERM II on the one hand and the quasi-insurance of a 
                                                                                                                                                                               
rise in current and expected future budget deficits results in real exchange rate appreciations, current account 
deficits and, ultimately, in an exhaustion of foreign reserves. 
20 This has been thought about currency boards, as well. Though the fall of Argentina’s Peso in December 2001 
indicates that also currency board arrangements can be doomed to fail.   20
likely bail-out by current members of EMU on the other hand might possibly invite 
governments in CEEC to excessive moral hazard. Consequently, the respective brinkmanship 
can possibly give CEEC a leeway in a subsequent bargaining on costs of convergence. Before 
tracing the brinkmanship strategy, the interests of both current and prospective members of 
EMU are reconsidered. 
 
All parties’ interests are self-evident: gaining political stability and (more or less) economic 
benefits – at best as a free lunch. There is obviously no free lunch and the accession process 
implies a costly convergence in course of the required compliance with the Maastricht 
criteria.
21 As CEEC are adjusting towards EMU, it seems natural to presume that they bear 
such costs. Most notably, ERM II might be considered as a two-year lasting device for 
loading the costs of convergence entirely onto the accession countries themselves. Current 
EMU-members’ reluctance to allow for immediate admittance to EMU might also be 
reasonable because, for instance, the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy and the 
functioning of automatic stabilisers in CEEC are still unclear. Thus they might associate the 
risks of a premature inclusion of CEEC with a fear that stability and credibility of the euro 
might be harmed. In this context, ERM II can also be regarded as a measure to continue 
testing the operation of automatic stabilisers and channels of monetary policy. 
Now prospective members of EMU might force euroland to provide some kind of extra-
funding or the like in order to prevent currency crises because they would most probably 
weaken the enlargement process effectively. Certainly, if an exchange-rate crisis became 
actually apparent, then that would also imply costs for CEEC. Both current and prospective 
members of EMU would be worse off by raising economic costs in a currency crisis’ 
aftermath and undermining the public support for the European integration process. 
However, employing a ‘quasi-adventuresome’ strategy of brinkmanship making exchange-rate 
policy a particular tightrope act might force current members of EMU to act as CEEC would 
like them to. The effectiveness of such brinkmanship rests on the extent of CEEC’ default: 
The more current members of EMU would be affected in respective political and/or 
economic terms, the more credible is the CEEC’ threat. That is to say, that the probability of 
a currency crisis incidence is subject to a critical threshold. If the respective probability were 
too small, the EU would not be coerced to provide assistance. However, the credibility of the 
                                                           
21 Besides, there are considerable costs, for instance, on account for implementing the acquis communautaire. 
Though these costs are not explicitly considered, because the focus here is on costs in terms of output and 
employment in course of the demanded compliance with the Maastricht criteria.   21
brinkmanship is also dependent on whether it is acceptable to the CEEC in the first place. If 
the probability of currency crisis were too high, CEEC would abstain from a hazardous 
exchange-rate policy. 
 
Overall, there is apparently room for political manoeuvre, i.e. CEEC practising brinkmanship. 
Accordingly, ERM II will most probably enable CEEC to load considerable costs of 
convergence onto current members of EMU. However, potential European incumbents’ 
precautions have to be considered, as well. These might possibly represent a hook in CEEC’ 
brinkmanship strategies. In this respect, once again the issue of credible external constraints 




It could be argued that Maastricht criteria provide a constraint to CEEC’ brinkmanship 
strategy. However, such external constraints might not be effective because it becomes less 
credible when the party imposing the constraints actually wants the other to join them (see 
above). That is valid for the indebtedness- as well as for the inflation-criterion. Considering 
the latter, CEEC would have to pursue rather restrictive monetary policies in ERM II. 
However, this kind of adjustment would probably come along with a recession. In this 
context, Natalucci and Ravenna (2002:28-9) indicate that such a welfare-inferior policy would 
probably not be implemented when CEEC’ eventual accession could not be credibly 
foreclosed by the incumbents. It is worth-noting in this context, that in the literature it is 
feared that CEEC might resort to artificial inflation reducing measures such as, for instance, 
transitory indirect tax reductions prior to their participation in ERM II. After attaining access, 
those might be suspended. According to Szapáry (2001) such phenomenon is denoted as a 
‘weighing-in syndrome’ (see also Deutsche Bundesbank 2001:26). 
Furthermore, the efficacy of economic surveillance is doubtful. There is already surveillance 
in terms of regular Notification and Pre-accession reports in place. Though, surveillance may 
help detect early moral hazard behaviour. However, it is unlikely to curb the corresponding 
incentives of soft pegs in ERM II. 
 
To the extent that the preceding measures might not represent effective external constraints, 
this might possibly hold for the choice of conversion rates at the outset of ERM II. 
Evidently, from the angle of current members of EMU undervalued conversion rates are   22
most favourable (Bofinger 1999:29). These might provide a precautionary measure against 
trend real appreciation, for instance, in course of exogenous shocks, i.e. positive supply 
shocks (Keefer and Stasavage 2001:13; see Babetski, et al. 2003:21). In particular, undervalued 
conversion rates would undermine an overvaluation scenario and the corresponding 
brinkmanship strategy. Just to mention the CEEC’ position in this regard: They would rather 
opt for overvalued central parities in order to exacerbate their exposure to currency crises. 
Generally, from an economic point of view, equilibrium exchange rates would be most 
favourable. They would neither distort purchasing powers, competitiveness, nor contribute to 
a redistribution of wealth, i.e. no effects on stocks of debts and claims.
22 
The determination of the ‘true’ equilibrium exchange rate is a particular problem, though. 
Ideally, markets determine such ‘balanced’ conversion rate. The determination of the 
conversion rate is, however, basically a political decision. Hence, even if floating would be 
allowed days before the actual conversion rate would be chosen at the dawn of ERM II, then 
rational agents will anticipate the conflict of interest in bargaining upon the appropriate 
choice of the conversion rate and no ‘true’ equilibrium exchange rate will emerge. 
Even if political implications are neglected, it is possible that accession countries enter ERM 
II with an overvalued central parity such as, for instance, Italy and Spain did in the former 
EMS.
23 Alike in case of the latter, exchange-rate regimes in CEEC could turn out to be a 
recipe for distress. 
With respect to incumbents’ countermeasures, CEEC should not be allowed to opt for 
narrower oscillation bands than +/– 15% around the conversion rate in order to make 
allowance for the trend real appreciation.
24 Although exchange-rate policy is a matter of 
                                                           
22 Here, we do not step into a detailed discussion of the distributional effects of alternative conversion rates on 
stocks of debts etc. as their impact on continuous economic policy might be of minor relevant. Yet to be added, 
it can be said that undervalued conversion rates favour agents accounting for debts denominated in domestic 
currency, but makes agents having obligations denominated in foreign currency worse off. The opposite holds 
for the case of overvalued conversion rates (cf. Crombrugghe 2001:4). 
23 Spain, for example, had joined the EMS with an overvalued exchange rate in 1989. It experienced a recession 
and failed to fight inflation effectively, thus, it devalued in 1992, and anew in 1993 and 1995. During the years of 
1989-92 Spain experienced considerable capital inflows. These were due to, first, expected higher rates of return, 
second, financial liberalization and, third, a restrictive monetary policy and expansionary fiscal policy, which 
meant high interest rates. A corresponding real exchange rate appreciation was also observable which is also 
imputed to a BS-effect. Most meaningful in this context seems to be the specific role of wages: During the two 
years prior to Spain’s participation in the former ERM, real wages increased moderately and did not developed 
significantly different to other European countries. However, after the Spanish accession both real and nominal 
wages rose sharply (Bacchetta 1994:25-7), which points in some respects to the above-mentioned ‘weighing-in 
syndrome’. 
24 Even such broad bands might be not sufficient to prevent speculative attacks. In January 2003 speculators 
attempted to drive the Hungarian Forint (soft peg with a +/– 15% band) above its upper limit and thus to 
trigger a revaluation of its central parity. Although revaluation do not really contradict the provisions of ERM II 
and the speculative attack was stalled, the occurrence of an attack points to the fragility of even such broad 
bands.   23
common concern already prior to ERM II, CEEC would probably introduce smaller bands – 
as some of these countries have already done (see Table 1). A subsequent widening of the 
fluctuation bands, though, might signal that both parties cannot agree on the ‘true’ 
conversion rate. Accordingly, market sentiments might shift and cause a destabilising process 
(for a more detailed discussion, see Bofinger 1999). 
 
To sum up, soft pegs can exhibit some charming incentives for policy-makers. From the 
point of view of political economy, policy-makers are most notably seeking to maximise 
votes. Soft pegs are really great in this respect as governments can comfort voters possibly 
even by some more additional budget spending respectively a less rigorous austerity. This 
might work as long as voters and policy-makers are not bothered with a probable future 
breakdown of the exchange-rate regime. Unilateral euroisation, however, runs counter to the 
(short-term) objective of maximising votes. If the exchange-rate policy affects private citizens 
welfare and accordingly their level of support for the government, the latter will favour soft 
pegs allowing for enlarged budget spending (in the short run) instead of the (politically) stony 
road of unilateral euroisation. 
Within ERM II, precisely those soft pegs are eligible which are also basically prone to 
speculative attacks. Trend real appreciation and the progressive full liberalisation of capital 
flows in a non-mature financial surrounding might even exacerbate possible exchange rate 
crises. Multiple equilibria regarding the credibility of fixed exchange rate are likely on account 
for difficulties in perceiving actually bad economic policy formation. Moreover, this gives rise 
to contagion effects spreading among CEEC. 
Most notably, the political economy dimension of the enlargement process shapes the 
political incentive structure in CEEC significantly. Respective politicians with a sufficiently 
short time horizon will not only make use of those comfortable incentive, but practice even 
more moral hazard due to the existing EU’ willingness to pay CEEC. The according 
brinkmanship may allow CEEC to elicit the EU’ willingness to pay. 
Current members of EMU do apparently not dispose of effective countermeasures as soon as 
CEEC are inside ERM II: Neither economic surveillance by current members of EMU, nor 
deliberately undervalued conversion rates and not a pointing at the small print, i.e. Maastricht 
criteria, will actually take effect. Thus, CEEC might most probably not be prevented from 
making use of the risk of exchange-rate crises. In this respect, ERM II will open up 
opportunities for CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members of   24
EMU. The following section summarizes and touches consequential prospects of the 





The focus of the preceding analysis has been on the particularities of CEEC’ exchange-rate 
policies within ERM II and generally in course of their integration into EMU. In doing so, it 
has become apparent that the shaping of political incentives for exchange-rate policy making 
might have ‘perverse’ effects. This might result in excessive moral hazard due to an existing 
EU’ willingness to pay for CEEC’ admittance to EMU. The according brinkmanship makes 
allowance for the subsequent bargaining on costs of convergence. 
 
Analysis has started with the critical assumption that the enlargement decision was basically a 
political decision aiming at a regional stabilisation of CEE. Accordingly, we arrived at the 
conclusion that the EU has a considerable willingness to pay for CEEC’ integration. Overall, 
this decision accounts for a momentous free-riding process. 
Moral hazard is really not a novel phenomenon in context of European economic policy 
coordination. However, there is a particular difference of the convergence play in course of 
the enlargement process to the preceding Maastricht process in the run-up to EMU. In case 
of the latter, Maastricht criteria had been a tying-hand strategy for the founding members of 
EMU. Now these provide just an external constraint, whose credibility is less effective 
because of the particular political dimension of the enlargement process. Although, the 
political stability in CEEC is substantially more fragile than in case of consolidated western 
European democracies, this does not inevitably entails that the EU reveals their willingness to 
pay. It is in principle conceivable that the accession countries pass through the qualification 
process adhered to Maastricht criteria including ERM II as long as they need to comply with 
its provisions. What really enables CEEC to elicit the EU’s willingness to pay for their 
accession is to create a scenario, which would credibly threaten to undermine their political 
stability. Such a credible threat can be attained by brinkmanship transmitted by exchange-rate 
policy. 
The characteristics of respective transmission mechanisms and relevant conditions for a 
successful brinkmanship have been delineated in this paper. Basically, a policy mix that may 
be considered as unsustainable with the soft peg in some circumstances brings the   25
transmission mechanisms forward in particular. In this regard, such fixed exchange-rate 
regimes, provided for by ERM II, can feature ‘perverse’ incentives for exchange-rate policy 
making. This applies particularly when Maastricht criteria are not considered as a sufficient 
external constraint. In this respect, CEEC might not take those rigorous steps in fiscal and 
monetary policies required for keeping up the fixed exchange-rate regime. Moreover, 
accession countries’ stability of exchange-rate regimes might be particularly at stake when 
economic conveniences are taken into account such as trend real appreciation and the 
decisive role of capital flows. Eventually, slacken the reins in terms of exchange-rate policy 
might put the exchange-rate regimes of CEEC in ERM II at risk, i.e. a currency crisis may 
evolve. 
Albeit, there is a deviation from the original term ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’, this brinkmanship 
bears some resemblance to it. In this regard, the overview of exchange-rate policy formation 
in CEEC during the 1990s is suitable for an accordant classification. The survey indicates that 
the accession countries pursued exchange-rate policy in terms of disinflation at the outset of 
transition. Then, they turned more to implicit exchange-rate targeting, though, still aiming at 
price stability. However, exchange-rate policy will probably be exploited for output and 
employment concerns. Indeed, such policy stance does not aim at competitive devaluations 
for improving external competitiveness. Yet, it might enable CEEC to ripe benefits at the 
expense of current members of the eurozone, i.e., by receiving some kind of extra-funding. In 
respect of the analysis, this particular kind of exchange-rate policy can be characterised as a 
‘threaten-thy-neighbour’-policy. 
It is important to notice that successful brinkmanship will by no means entail a currency crisis 
– in that case such strategy would have failed. Furthermore, we will possibly not even observe 
that current members provide CEEC with extra-funding in monetary terms. The EU’ 
willingness to pay might, for instance, rather result in an allowance for additional 
indebtedness and higher inflation rates. Thus, CEEC’ specific costs of convergence in the 
light of Maastricht criteria would be lowered. However, possibly solely the exclusion of soft 
pegs in ERM II might prevent CEEC effectively from being prone to exchange-rate crises. 
As a consequence ERM II would have to be radically modified and only floats to be allowed. 
However, betting on a revision of the Treaty is rather inappropriate. 
It has been shown that current members of EMU do not dispose of effective 
countermeasures when CEEC are already participating in ERM II. But, a quick introduction 
of the euro as legal tender in CEEC could be a feasible option for current members of EMU. 
Alternatively and in contrast to the ECB’ present attitude towards an early introduction of the   26
euro, CEEC could be encouraged unilateral euroisation. In doing so, current members of 
EMU would forestall that CEEC squeeze out their willingness to pay. However, as an early 
introduction of the euro would probably affect the price stability of the euro itself, this option 
is to inflict a worst or a next-worst outcome on current members. Therefore, the EU is rather 
exposed to a ‘Catch-22’-situation. 
With regard to the overall analysis, the political economy perspective indicates that Maastricht 
criteria, in particular ERM II shapes the enlargement differently than originally foreseen. In 
contrast to the former Maastricht process of convergence 1995-1997, this time applicant 
states will probably get paid for their admittance. That is to say, that current EMU-members 
will likely undertake to pay for CEEC’ costs of convergence. This will either result in higher 
charges or in a modified institutional setting for economic policy coordination within an 
enlarging eurozone, i.e. adjustment matters. According to the analysis, it is rather unlikely that 
institutional arrangements, for instance, such as the Stability Pact will still prevail in an 
enlarged eurozone. Certainly, this would also affect the price stability of the euro. As long as 
the emergence of currency crises and, correspondingly, strategic exchange-rate policies of 
CEEC, i.e. brinkmanship, cannot be excluded it seems almost inevitable that the price 
stability of the euro will get harmed. However, regarding public support for European 
integration in CEEC and overall political stability in an enlarging EU you may consider this 
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